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“All men by nature desire to know.”
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a25
1. New virtue epistemology: From the importance to the value  
of reflection
Judgment and Agency (SoSa, 2015) describes a development in Ernest Sosa’s virtue epis-
temology, centered on the “more agential and reflective side of [his] virtue epistemology”. In 
his previous work, particularly after Knowledge in Perspective (SoSa, 1991), he proposed a dis-
tinction between animal and reflective knowledge. This distinction aimed to overcome disputes 
between an externalist perspective (dealing with the processes for the formation of beliefs), on 
the one hand, and an internist perspective (concerned with the way in which cognitive agents 
deal with reasons to believe) on the other.
In his new book, Sosa intends to overcome another dichotomy, which has featured in de-
bates within virtue epistemology itself, namely, the distinction between virtue epistemologies, 
centered on reliablist points of view (which consider agents’ competencies and skills), and those 
centered on responsibilist ones (aware of the epistemic agent’s character traits). Centered on the 
notions of knowing full well, epistemic competence and judgmental belief, Sosa posits that the 
“new virtue epistemology” is, in fact, a virtue reliabilist epistemology and a more radical form 
of a responsibilist epistemology, since it considers “responsibilist, agential competences to be 
crucial for a proper treatment of the most central, most traditional issues of pure epistemology” 
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The “new virtue epistemology” goes beyond the simple externism/internism dicho-
tomy seen in the animal/reflective distinction. It reintroduces to the contemporary debate 
the sort of knowledge at the center of the classic epistemological tradition, from the Pyrrho-
nists through Descartes, which is high-level reflective knowledge, characterized as knowle-
dge “requiring free, volitional endorsement by the subject who judges, or the corresponding 
disposition” (Sosa, 2015, p. 36). In this sense, the idea of judgment – which is related to both 
epistemic agency and reflection (SoSa, 2014, p. 177) – starts to occupy a central position, sin-
ce a “judgment is affirmation in the endeavor to affirm with apt correctness” (SoSa, 2015, p. 
66).  Judgment is both the act of affirming something with an intention and the disposition to 
consciously judge.  In other words, “[j]udgment is affirmation in the endeavor to affirm aptly”, 
demonstrating competence and not only producing the correct affirmation but doing this 
aptly.  Reflection is required in judgment, because the agent who judges “affirms fully aptly 
only if guided to a correct and apt affirmation by second-order awareness of their competence 
to so affirm” (SoSa, 2015, p. 80). 
Here we address two recurring themes in Sosa’s work, which occupy a central position 
in the book: the place and importance of reflection in the cognitive economy of the epistemic 
agent and epistemic value.  Regarding the former, Sosa (2015, p. 86) believes that “the aptness 
of epistemic affirmation on the first order is attained through the guidance of apt second-order 
awareness that such affirmation would then be apt”. In terms of the latter theme, in a section in 
which he deals with “human communication” and the “value of knowledge”, he asserts that “hu-
man knowledge is at least as important for human flourishing as is communication, both for the 
flourishing of individual lives, and for the collective flourishing of groups” (SoSa, 2015, pp. 189)1.
In our opinion, although Sosa presents an eloquent argument in favor of the importance 
of reflection in epistemology (an argument that many of his critics must be inclined to accept), 
his defense of the value of reflection is not an argument.
1 Regarding the relationship between epistemic value and human flourishing, see Ernest Sosa (2011, 
pp. 62, 66 and 66n).  Also, see the articles by Berit Brogaard (2014) and the interesting debate between 
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2. Animal and reflective knowledge
Between Knowledge in Perspective (SoSa, 1991) and Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and 
Reflective Knowledge (SoSa, 2009), Sosa defends bi-level epistemology based on a distinction 
between animal knowledge (AK) and reflective knowledge (RK)2.  In Sosa (1985, p. 240) the 
following distinction is established:
(AK) One has animal knowledge about one’s environment, one’s past, and one’s own expe-
rience if one’s judgments and beliefs about these are direct responses to their impact – e.g., 
through perception or memory – with little or no benefit of reflection or understanding.
(RK) One has reflective knowledge if one’s judgment or belief manifests not only such direct 
response to the fact known but also understanding of its place in a wider whole that inclu-
des one’s belief and knowledge of it and how these come about.
These definitions undergo later refinements, but the general meaning remains.  Beliefs 
are a special case of performance, of epistemic performances: when a true belief is attributed to 
the subject’s competence under the appropriate conditions, this count as an apt belief and as a 
kind of knowledge, animal knowledge (SoSa, 2007, p. 93).  An agent has animal knowledge if 
his belief is apt, in other words: a) the belief is true (it achieves its objective), b) if the belief is 
the manifestation of the subject’s skills, c) if the belief is true because it arises from the subject’s 
competence; then he does not arrive at the truth by accident (SoSa, 2007, p. 92).
Reflective knowledge, in the other hand, is knowledge acquired as the result of the ra-
tional epistemic agent’s intentional and conscious investigation.  Reflective knowledge requires 
not only apt belief but also defensible apt belief, in other words, an apt belief in which the subject 
aptly believes that it is apt and where the subject’s aptness may be defended against skeptical 
objections (SoSa, 2007, p. 24).  While animal knowledge only requires that a belief is true, reflec-
tive knowledge additionally requires that the agent have an epistemic perspective “from which 
2 In Judgment and Agency (SoSa, 2015), Sosa talks about something inferior to animal knowledge 
(subcredal animal knowledge) and considers various degrees, up to the maximum human degree, which 
is knowing full well; here it is possible to conceive not two, but three levels of knowledge: animal, reflec-
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he endorses the source of that belief, from which he can see that source as reliably truth-con-
ducive” (SoSa, 2009, p. 135). 
In the first case (AK), one may talk of “animal competence”, since it is does not require 
the cognitive agent to strive “to endorse the reliability of the competence” in the same way, nor 
does it “require the believer to endorse the appropriateness of the conditions for the exercise of 
the competence in forming that belief.” (SoSa, 2011, pp. 149-50).  In the second case (RK), one 
may talk of reflective justification, rather than justification only arising from reliability.  The (RK) 
case requires a rational endorsement of the reliability of the competence exercised by the agent 
and the “appropriateness of the conditions for its exercise” (SoSa, 2011, p. 15). In these terms, 
reflective knowledge goes beyond animal knowledge (SoSa, 2007, p. 108).
3. From animal/reflective knowledge to knowing full well
Reflection is not necessary for knowledge in its most basic or animal sense.  We know 
animally even when we are not apt to justify and to present reasons in favor of our knowled-
ge.  However, in a scenario of epistemic evaluation, when the subject is challenged to assess the 
status of their beliefs in the light of epistemic values, when it is necessary to declare that one’s 
belief is true, competent, safe, coherent etc., in the face of skeptical objections (SoSa 2009, pp. 
136-7), it is necessary for the epistemic agent to undertake a cognitive performance which is 
able to endorse the source of this belief and guarantee its reliability, forming a meta-apt or fully 
apt belief (SoSa 2011, p. 10).
This, according to Sosa, is what characterizes the knowledge problem in the epistemolo-
gical tradition from Sextus to Descartes.  Thus, from the point of view of epistemic evaluation:
Apt belief, animal knowledge, is better than belief that succeeds in its aim, being true, wi-
thout being apt. Apt belief aptly noted, reflective knowledge, is better than mere apt belief 
or animal knowledge, especially when the reflective knowledge helps to guide the first-or-
der belief so that it is apt. (SoSa 2011, p. 12-13)
The reflective knowledge ‘that p’ is epistemically better than the stand-alone animal 
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titute better knowledge” (SoSa 2009, p. 136).  However, in Judgment and Agency the distinction 
between animal and reflective knowledge gives way to a sharper distinction between animal 
knowledge and knowing full well.  This is because knowing full well necessarily involves reflective 
knowledge.  This is due to the fact that our “rational nature is most fully manifest in such reaso-
ned choice and judgment” (SoSa 2015, p. 51). An epistemic performance is fully apt – and not 
merely apt – if this performance is guided towards aptness through the agent’s reflectively apt 
risk assessment, examining his own competency and aptness3.
4. The value of reflection
In relation to the appraisal perspective, a point shared by Sosa and other epistemologists, 
such as Pritchard (2010a), is that “[t]he importance of knowledge derives in good measure from 
how it relates to human achievement generally” (SoSa 2015, p. 142), in particular because this 
involves the disposition to affirm judgmentally in an endeavor to answer a given question cor-
rectly. “Endeavor” and “achievement”4 are key words to characterize those things most valued in 
our epistemic performances.
In Judgment and Agency (pp. 84-88), Sosa presents a new defense about the importance of 
reflection.  But can this argument help us understand the value of reflection?  At a certain point, 
he asks the following questions:
… why should that second-order dimension matter for our first-order knowledge? Why 
does it matter whether one has merely animal knowledge or “ascends” rather to the more 
reflective levels? Why isn’t reflective knowledge just more knowledge, animal knowledge on 
top of animal knowledge? And why should the second-order animal knowledge improve the 
knowledge on the first order, raising it to a better level of knowledge? (SoSa, 2015, pp. 84-5)
3 “…we highlight that full aptness of performance requires guidance through the agent’s knowled-
ge that their performance would be apt. Through that fact we then explain why knowing full well is not 
just animal knowledge on top of animal knowledge… It is crucial to this further explanatory benefit that 
in order to know full well the subject must be aptly aware that their affirmation would be apt.” (SoSa, 
2015, p. 87).





Thus, reflection is important because, through it, the agent has the competency to develop 
some perspective about his epistemic position: the aptness of the agent’s cognitive performance 
at the first-order level is achieved under the guidance of second-order consciousness, since the 
agent has the competence to avoid excessive risk of failure (SoSa, 2015, p. 85)5.
The main idea is: reflection makes us better epistemic agents. The reason is that: 
Opting for such rational guidance does involve judgment and risk in any given case, and a 
faith in reason as our best guide. When research reveals the hidden influences that move us, 
moreover, that may just help us to enhance the competence of our management. Those re-
velations may lead us to avoid certain situations, competently, virtuously so, and to undergo 
relevant therapy over time, thus counteracting inappropriate influences. (SoSa, 2015, p. 87)
This opens up the possibility of a resumption of the Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia, since 
the meaning of knowing full well is directly linked to the realization of the ideals of a complete 
human life.
5. Sosa on Human Flourishing
In Sosa’s recent epistemology (SoSa, 2011; 2015), the idea of human flourishing plays an 
important role in his framework, since it explains why knowledge is important.  Furthermore, 
it explains not only why knowledge is better than true belief, but also why knowing full well is 
better than knowing aptly. In this section, we will analyze exactly what Sosa means by ‘human 
flourishing’ and how this explains the value of knowledge in Sosa’s theory.
Sosa begins his explanation of human flourishing (SoSa, 2015, p. 133) by quoting Aristot-
le’s Nicomachean Ethics:
5 Sosa’s complete argument is that reflection is important for four basic reasons: (a) “because of 
the nature of judgment and how it differs from guessing”; (b) “because of the nature of suspension”; (c) 
“because of how competence must avoid negligence and insensitivity to defeaters”; and “as a bonus, (d) 
we also gain insight into the special status of the Cartesian cogito (SoSa, 2015, p. 85).  Moreover, reflection 
allows us to explain Gettier’s family cases (SoSa, 2015, p. 85).





It is possible to do something that is in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by 
chance or at the suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when he 
has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it 
in accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself. (EN II 4, 1105a22–6)
Here Sosa is trying to demonstrate that by “doing it in accordance with knowledge,” Aris-
totle is ruling out any kind of accidental success or coincidence. This is a key point, since later 
on Sosa quotes Aristotle to demonstrate how this relates to human good and a flourishing life 
(SoSa, 2015, p. 134). This perspective seems to be clearer in the following fragment (EN I 7, 
1098a16–17): “… human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if 
there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete”.
Human good is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, meaning that any kind 
of luck or coincidence must be ruled out. That is why “Aristotelian flourishing involves the exer-
cise of one’s virtues, moral and intellectual” (SoSa, 2015, p. 134). What does this mean exactly? 
What are the necessary elements for such flourishing?
According to Sosa (2015, p.141), what is necessary for human flourishing on Aristotle’s 
view is the aptness of the agent’s performance. Luck success is not sufficient but rather, an 
aptness that manifest the agent relevant competence. That is why flourishing requires not only 
a means-end successful action, but also an aptness success. In other words, in order to be an 
action in accordance with virtue, it is important to avoid luck or success by chance. 
However, why a means-end successful action is necessary to flourishing? Because accor-
ding to Sosa, Aristotelian action involves “choice based on a resultant favoring of one’s imple-
menting a plan to attain a goal at which one thereby aims” (SoSa, 2014, p.140). That is why a com-
petent choice is a choice in accordance with virtue, excluding any kind of lucky choice or success.
What we have now is the following: in order for an action to constitute flourishing, 
it must be an action based on a competent choice. One must have a plan to achieve a goal, 
and act based on this plan. The action must be in accordance with one’s virtues, which me-
ans that it must be successful and apt. It cannot constitute success by luck, coincidence or 
chance. It means that when a successful apt action occurs, it constitutes a flourishing life, on 
Sosa’s sense. 





How does this explain the value of knowledge and how does it solve the value problem? 
In Plato’s Meno, the value problem is explained as follows: there are two travelers that want to 
go to Larissa. One of them knows the way to Larissa, while the other has a true belief about the 
way to Larissa, but does not really know the way. Both of them reach Larissa successfully. The 
questions we can ask now is: Why is knowledge better than mere true belief? Why do we think 
that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, since both travelers will successfully 
reach Larissa, demonstrating that knowledge and mere true belief can both achieve success? 
Sosa’s answer to the value problem is that one of the travelers reaches Larissa through 
competence in accordance with virtue while the ignorant traveler does not deserve full credit 
for his success, since it was not a virtuous competence action. As Sosa says, “to reach Larissa 
through ignorant luck is not to flourish” (SoSa, 2015, p.142), and that is the difference between 
the two travelers. 
The solution proposed by Sosa to the value problem is to demonstrate that there is a di-
fference between the two travelers: one acts in accordance with virtue because he successfully 
and aptly reaches Larissa, while the other does not. In addition, because the “ignorant traveler” 
reaches Larissa by luck, albeit successfully, his success is not to flourish. This solution appears to 
demonstrate that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, because it is a constituent 
of human flourishing. For Sosa, the value of knowledge is not an instrumental value, but rather 
a kind of constituent value. Using communications as an example, Sosa explains:
Human communication is important for human flourishing, for the flourishing of indivi-
duals and for the flourishing of groups. This does not require that there be any distincti-
ve communicative final value. […] Moreover, communication enables flourishing not only 
instrumentally, but even constitutively, as shown by the place of communication in human 
relationships. […] But from this it hardly follows that so much as a single act of communi-
cation need have any final value distinctively its own, or indeed any final value of its own 
at all. Much less does it follow that all successful acts of communication must have some 
such final value. 
Just so, human knowledge is at least as important for human flourishing as is communica-
tion, both for the flourishing of individual lives, and for the collective flourishing of groups. 
But this no more requires any distinctive epistemic final value than does the importance of 





communication require any distinctive communicative final value. It is required at most that 
knowledge be an important component of enough human ways of flourishing, which can 
take many and various forms. (SoSa, 2015, p.189) 
Sosa’s solution does not state that knowledge has a final value6, nor is this an instru-
mental value. It is a distinct kind of value, the value of being an important component of human 
flourishing. Human flourishing, which, according to Sosa, means, “a life of accomplishment, 
while activity of soul relevantly avoids luck to the extent that it is in accordance with virtue” 
(SoSa, 2015, p.156).  Bearing this in mind, Sosa explains that knowledge is not only better than 
mere true belief, but that what is required for full human flourishing – and by this we believe he 
means full human knowledge – is better than mere knowledge (SoSa, 2015, p.189-190).
Human flourishing is a central plank of Sosa’s solution to the value problem. If our un-
derstanding of Sosa’s framework is correct, we can summarize his solution as follows: Human 
flourishing in Aristotle is a fundamental ethical value; it means a life of accomplishment in 
accordance with virtue, which means a life of achievements, apt success; knowledge is a funda-
mental part of human flourishing. As Sosa says, “it is hard to imagine a flourishing human life or 
society deprived entirely of knowledge” (2015, p.189). The value of knowledge is neither a final 
value, nor an instrumental one: it is a distinct kind of value, a constituent value, since knowle-
dge is a constituent of human flourishing. That is why knowledge is more valuable than mere 
true belief: both can lead to success, but only knowledge is flourishing. Reflective knowledge is 
also more valuable than animal knowledge, since “[even] better … [is] what is required for the 
full human flourishing of that life” (SoSa, 2015, p. 190). 
6. Considerations regarding Sosa’s solution
Although Sosa’s new virtue epistemology appears to be very promising in explaining 
different epistemology intuitions and demonstrating that it is possible to join both a reliabilist 
and a responsibilist account of virtue epistemology, we believe that solving the value problem 
requires further clarification, in order to really explain the value of knowledge. In this section, 
6 Duncan Pritchard (2010b, pp. 25-47) offers the thesis that there is a final epistemic value.





we are going to put forward certain considerations and attempt to demonstrate that without 
this clarification, Sosa’s solution of the value problem fails to explain why knowledge is better 
than mere true belief.
As demonstrated in the last section, the idea of human flourishing is central to the value 
of knowledge. Sosa is not saying that knowledge has either final or instrumental value. The 
value of knowledge is the value of being a component of human flourishing. What kind of value 
is this? Take hydrogen, for example. Hydrogen is an important element in water. Without hydro-
gen, there is no water. Does this mean that hydrogen is valuable because it is a constituent of 
water? Only if water has some kind of value. Thus, hydrogen is valuable because of the relative 
value of water. But imagine a universe without any form of life, and only one planet with some 
oceans and rivers made up of H2O. Does hydrogen have any value in this universe? Since it 
would be hard to say that water has any kind of value, it is also hard to say whether hydrogen 
has any kind of value. The point here is that being an important element in something does not 
confer value. 
The first point Sosa needs to explain, then, is this: why is human flourishing – that requires 
necessarily success plus aptness – valuable? What kind of value does human flourishing have? 
In Aristotle, what gives value to the idea of human flourishing is eudaimonia, since Aristotle 
defines eudaimonia as the highest human good:
Now happiness [eudaimonia], more than anything else, seems complete without qualifi-
cation. For we always choose it because of itself, never because of something else. Honor, 
pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves, since 
we would choose each of them even if it had no further result; but we also choose them 
for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, by 
contrast, no one ever chooses for their sake, or for the sake of anything else at all. (ariStotle, 
NE, 1097b5)
For Aristotle, everything in human life only has value because of eudaimonia, the highest 
human good. Book X provides more information about what exactly eudaimonia is:
If happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for it to accord with the supre-
me virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing. The best is understanding, or whatever 





else seems to be the natural ruler and leader, and to understand what is fine and divine, 
by being itself either divine or the most divine element in us. Hence, complete happiness 
will be its activity in accord with its proper virtue; and we have said that this activity is the 
activity of study. (ariStotle, NE, 1177a15)
If eudaimonia is the highest good, and knowledge is part of it, then knowledge is better 
than mere true belief, since it is an important part of this highest human good. In addition, this 
explains why knowledge has a special value over mere true belief. Meanwhile, this does not 
seem to be what Sosa is trying to say. Sosa does not explain whether his concept of human 
flourishing is valuable because it is related to a unique supreme human good, as Aristotle does. 
If Sosa understands human flourishing as valuable because of the final value of eudaimonia, 
which leads us to pose the following questions: what reasons do we have for deciding that Aris-
totle’s framework is the correct one? Is there any supreme virtue? Is understanding the supreme 
element in us, as Aristotle says? It seems that using the eudaimonistic framework for the value 
problem raises more questions than it answers7. 
Sosa does not provide any evidence that he is using Aristotle’s whole framework. If he 
does not assume that human flourishing has value because of some higher or supreme good, 
there appears to be a serious problem: What reasons do we have to accept that human flou-
rishing requires success plus aptness, instead of any kind of success? And, more importantly: 
Why is human flourishing, as defined by Sosa, valuable? Suppose that human flourishing re-
quires any kind of success and that we, as humans, want to flourish both individually and as a 
society. If flourishing – as requiring only any kind of success – is valuable to us, we can easily 
imagine a world controlled by some god or genius, who makes us hallucinate about what we 
perceive most of the time, and make things appears exactly as hallucinated. For example, I 
hallucinate that there is an apple in front of me and when I try to pick up the apple, the genius 
makes an apple appear and I am able to eat it. In this world, all we have is lucky success. Because 
we have success, we are able to flourish, both individually and socially. According to this point 
7 As Christoph Kelp noted on a comment to the previous version of this paper, one way to try to resolve 
this tension might be by acknowledging that Aristotle’s claim about what eudaimonia amounts to in particular 
might be a bit strong. We believe that this is correct. For an excellent analysis and critics about the eudaimonistic 
solution to the value problem and other solutions, as for example, the achievement solution, see Yunker (2014). 





of view, knowledge does not need to be a constituent of flourishing and, because of this, has no 
extra value over mere true belief. 
At this point it is possible to show Sosa’s first problem: He has to explain why human 
flourishing has value. Sosa could accept Aristotle’s eudaimonistic framework and say that know-
ledge has final value relative to the highest human good.  However, Sosa explicitly says that 
knowledge has no final value, and makes no reference to eudaimonia or any supreme highest 
good. Further, it seems as if Sosa does not believe in any highest human good or any kind of 
unified good life, which will determine the value of human flourishing. Sosa says that “commu-
nication [is] a sufficiently important component of enough human ways of flourishing, which 
can take many and various forms” (SoSa, 2015, p. 189, our italics). That is why we assume that he 
does not accept Aristotle’s whole framework8. However, Sosa then has to face a more serious 
question: What reason do we have for accepting that human flourishing requires apt success 
and not just success, for example? A human society can easily flourish on only lucky success, as 
we have suggested. Perhaps this is a different version of the value problem: why is flourishing 
with aptness better than “mere flourishing”? Sosa does not answer this question.
We can use the same strategy to emphasize another point about the value of knowle-
dge, this time demonstrating that there is no difference in value between animal knowledge 
and knowing full well. At some point, Sosa asks why well-based happiness is better than the 
“equally subjectively pleasant tone of the subject in an experience machine victimized by a 
controlling demon” (2015, p.189). This question is a variation on the value problem. That is why 
we may add another question: Why is knowing full well better than animally knowing? Sosa’s 
answer to this question is that the life of the victim of the demon’s machine is not a flourishing 
human life, even though all his subjective pleasure and happiness is real (2015, p.189-190).
Nevertheless, the question is not solved. Why is the life of the demon’s victim not a flou-
rishing life? As we have argued before, we have no reason to say that human flourishing is success 
8 If Sosa accepts the eudaimonia solution, then he has to address other problems. The eudaimonia 
solution assumes that there is a unified “good life”, a unique way of full human flourishing, and that 
knowledge is a constituent of this. The problem is that it is possible to reject the idea of a unified good life 
and show that knowledge is not a part of some forms of good life. We will not enter into this strategy in 
detail, although part of it will be used in our second argument against Sosa. 





plus aptness, since we are not using the eudaimonistic framework. For this reason, it is arbitrary to 
say that the life of the inhabitant of the Matrix or the hedonistic victim is not a flourishing human 
life. Especially if there are “many and various forms” of flourishing. The matrix dweller can have 
real pleasure, he can even have animal knowledge of various forms, such as knowledge about his 
pain or pleasure, and he can be successful (but without aptness) on his life goals, which could be, 
for example, a life of pleasure listening to classical music every day.9 What reasons do we have for 
saying that this is not a good life, a well lived life, and a flourishing life? We believe that the answer 
is “none”, if we assume that there are many and various forms of human flourishing. 
Sosa answer is that in human life, it is better truth than falsity. He also writes that “bet-
ter competence than incompetence, yes, but better yet what is required for the full human 
flourishing of that life” (SoSa, 2015, p.190). It seems here that Sosa actually begs the question. 
Meno’s question takes on exactly this form: why is x better than y? Why is knowledge better 
than true belief? Why is reflective knowledge better than animal knowledge? Why is well-ba-
sed happiness or pleasure better than the equally subjectively pleasant tone of the subject in an 
experience machine, victimized by a controlling demon? Sosa’s solution is that for a flourishing 
human life x is better than y. 
9 Kelp made an interest comment about our argument at this point. He said that we often aim not 
only to succeed but also to achieve (which we believe, this is also how Sosa believe). If so, the person in 
the experience machine may not be able to even succeed in all of her life goals.
Kelp asked us to compare the following case: a very successful marathon runner (that won many marathons 
during her life) finds out at the end of her career that all the races she ever won a medal in were fixed in her 
favor. This would be very disappointing for her and might seriously undermine her evaluation of her profes-
sional life. Why? (i) Because she wanted not only to succeed but also to succeed by achievement, (ii) because 
achievements matter.
A reply to this argument would be the following: imagine the same case, but she never discover that the races 
were fixed in her favor. This is exactly the idea behind the Matrix or demon’s examples. Even if she wanted to 
achieve but only succeeded, why not to say that she had a flourishing life? Again: what about the people that 
does not want to achieve, but only succeed? We can imagine the same marathon runner but that had as a life 
goal win the maximum of marathon as possible, no matter what. When she discover that the races were fixed, 
probably she would not care. She succeeded on her life goals. Why not to say that she had a flourishing life? 
Our point is: What are the arguments that shows that achievement is necessary for a flourishing life? That is 
what we believe Sosa needs to clarify, since it seems that he did not bring this argument on his book.





Nevertheless, for which form of flourishing human life, given that there are many? It is 
not hard to imagine a human life flourishing without any reflective knowledge. For example, a 
life of instincts where the only goal is to reproduce, find food and have pleasure. That kind of life 
could flourish very well, without any reflective knowledge. This means that, if “what is required 
for the full human flourishing of that life” is reflective knowledge, for those lives in which flou-
rishing means only reproducing, finding food and having pleasure (even illusory pleasures), not 
only is reflective knowledge no better than mere animal knowledge, it has no use in making 
such a life flourish. 
7. Final Remarks
Sosa’s new virtue epistemology has many advantages, but we believe that in terms of the 
value problem, there is a need for clarification. The way the solution is presented appears to be 
unsatisfactory. Although the “human flourishing” solution appears to be a good solution, there 
is a need to explain why human flourishing has value. This is similar to the swamping problem: 
why does the reliabilism of a process give value to the product, if what matters in the end is a 
good product? Why does being a constituent part of flourishing give value to knowledge, if what 
matters is just success? We believe that, although Sosa’s solution is promising, it fails to explain 
either the value of knowledge or the value of reflective knowledge over animal knowledge.10
10 We would like to thank both to Ernest Sosa, that made valuable comments on our paper during 
the Book Symposium in Salvador, Brazil, and to Christoph Kelp, that also made valuable comments on 
the previous version of this paper. 
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in this paper, we discuss two recurring themes in sosa’s work, reexamined in Judgment and Agency (SoSa, 2015) 
from a new angle, i.e. the place and importance of reflection in the cognitive economy of the epistemic agent, and 
epistemic value.  Regarding the latter, sosa suggests that knowing full well, which necessarily involves reflection, 
has value because it contributes to human flourishing. Although sosa’s “new virtue epistemology” appears very 
promising in explaining different intuitions regarding epistemology and demonstrating that it is possible to join 
reliabilist and responsibilist accounts of virtue epistemology, we believe that solving the value problem requires 
further clarification in order to truly explain the value of knowledge.
Key-words: Human flourishing, Reflective Knowledge, Virtue epistemology.
ResuMo
neste ensaio, nós discutimos dois temas recorrentes na obra de ernest sosa que são reexaminados em Judgment 
and Agency (SoSa, 2015) a partir de um novo ângulo, a saber, de um lado, o lugar e importância da reflexão na 
economia cognitive de uma agente epistêmico e, do outro, o valor epistêmico. A cerca do último, sosa sugere que 
knowing full well, que necessariamente envolve reflexão, tem valor porque contribui para o florescimento huma-
no. embora a “new virtue epistemology” de sosa parece muito promissor para explicar diferentes intuições em epis-
temologia e demonstrando que é possível integrar as perspectivas confiabilista e responsibilista da epistemologia 
virtude, nós acreditamos que a solução do problema de valor requer uma maior clarificação a fim de realmente 
explicar o valor do conhecimento
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